For about the last eight years, the U.S. force in Afghanistan has basically been maintaining a holding action. Recently that has changed with a series of offensives, notably including the battle for Marjah.

Marjah is, according to the geopolitical experts at STRATFOR.com, “perhaps the quintessential example of a good location from which to base.” It’s in the heart of Taliban-dominated Helmand province and very close to Kandahar, Afghanistan’s “second city.” It’s also a religious center and the birthplace of the Taliban.

Some soldiers in Afghanistan cavalierly refer to enemy combatants as "Hadji," the character (above) from the sixties cartoon Jonny Quest. These soldiers are mistaken, however, as Hadji is, in fact, from India, not Afghanistan.

Not to mention the heroin: Helmand province produces more heroin than any country on the planet. Some experts estimate that the heroin trade in Marjah supplies the Taliban with around $200,000 per month.

In terms of overall strategy (with the long-term goal of changing the conditions in the country to make a stable democratic government possible), the battle for Marjah is consistent with two main U.S. goals.

The first is to deny the Taliban control of poppy farming communities and large population centers, and the second is to oversee the implementation of a civilian government opposed to the Taliban.
The success or failure of the American experiment in Afghanistan is far from certain; indeed, as Bokhari, Zeihan, and Hughes wrote back in February, “the only measure that matters cannot be judged until the Afghans are left to themselves.”

In any case, whether you think we should be there or not, whether a stable, democratic Afghanistan ultimately succeeds or fails, we ought to remember and be thankful for our brave men and women who are fighting the bad guys out in some of the most remote and inhospitable areas of the world.

Semper fidelis, blessed countrymen. You are not forgotten.

Update: According to Urban Dictionary, the term “hadji,” interchangeable with “haji” and “hajji,” has its origins in “al-haj,” the traditional Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca. Someone who has gone on the pilgrimage is given the deferential title “hajji,” although in army slang the term has been vulgarized to refer to all middle easterners. Special thanks to “panzodanzo,” frequent commenter on this blog, for this update.

Earlier this month I wrote an article criticizing as dangerous George Will’s plan to withdraw from Afghanistan. Now, it has come out that Joe Biden is advocating a similar plan to draw down troop levels, give up protecting the Afghan government and people and instead use special forces and drones to attack Al-Qaida bases inside Pakistan.

Now the Obama administration is considering completely changing their strategy that they announced six months ago. Before that, Obama committed 21,000 troops shortly after taking office, then in March he committed himself to preventing a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan.

Now he’s reconsidering strategy before we even have a chance to fully implement the previous strategy. This just goes to show that Obama is far too inexperienced in national security matters. This could be made up for with competent advisers, but except for Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Obama has none. And Gates has been the main advocate for a “surge” strategy in Afghanistan.

If you think that Joe Biden’s idea sounds a lot like US strategy towards Afghanistan under the Clinton Administration before 9/11, you’re not alone. Bill Roggio has an excellent and detailed article on why counterterrorism at the expense of counterinsurgency will allow Al-Qaida to re-establish bases in the region. It may lead to renewed support for the Taliban from within the Pakistani intelligence services, and reliance on cross border attacks could increase the power of anti-American elements in the Pakistani government.

In short, pulling out of Afghanistan will do nothing but harm America’s national security.

He is not alone. A CBS poll this past week shows that 41% of Americans want troop levels in Afghanistan decreased. Part of the poll clearly shows partisanship at work – Republicans are far more likely to disapprove of Obama’s war policies than Democrats. However, the percentage of Americans who want to begin withdrawing of Afghanistan has increased from 24% in February to 41% today.

There is a public opinion shift underway, and it is a very strange one. Despite our national myth that Americans only fight in self-defense, since gaining independence we have fought only three major wars in which we had a clear-cut, open-and-shut claim of self-defense: The Barbary Wars, World War II and the current war in Afghanistan.

The United States is a democracy, and when at war America has always faced a strong strain of domestic opposition to war. During the American Revolution, many loyalists who opposed the break with Britain fought in the British Army. The War of 1812, Civil War, Philippine-American War and World War I all saw significant domestic opposition. More recently, wars in Korea, Vietnam and Iraq have spawned widespread discontent amongst the populace.

However, the sizable minority (or sometimes majority) of Americans opposed to most wars have generally not been opposed to wars fought in clear-cut instances of self-defense. Domestic opposition to American involvement in World War II was negligible. So was opposition to the war in Afghanistan, until recently. What has changed? And is it reasonable to consider withdrawing from Afghanistan?

George Will’s article encapsulates many of the commonly held popular beliefs which inform the debate about Afghanistan. It also serves as an unintentional commentary on the way modern Americans perceive war.

Will argues that the American counter-insurgency strategy of “clear and hold” is ineffective in Afghanistan, because the Taliban can “evaporate and then return.” This is, of course, the entire point of a clear and hold strategy, which seeks to control territory rather than searching and destroying the enemy. In a clear and hold strategy, American forces move into an enemy controlled region. The Taliban leave, trying to avoid a pitched battle. The Americans then build a base to provide security in the region. When the Taliban return, there is now a base in the region which keeps them from re-establishing control of the area. This strategy was a major component of Petraeus’ successful campaign to turn around the war in Iraq. Now, large swaths of Iraq are peaceful and the war is all but over.

Will also brings up the drug trade issue. Yes, it is true that large swaths of rural Afghanistan produce most of the world’s opium. It is also true that much of this money goes to fund the Taliban insurgency. But Will does not explain how an American withdrawal is going to make things better in this regard. The fact is, it won’t. It will merely allow Afghanistan to become a full-blown narco-state.

Will also brings out the old canards about Afghanistan’s poverty and ineffective central government. But no one thinks Afghanistan is going to become a first world country anytime soon, and central government will always have limited power. Generally, conservatives are in favor of central governments with limited power, but Will seems to forget these conservative principles here.

Will argues that instead of trying to build a functioning state in Afghanistan that can control its territory, we should remove our troops and use drones, cruise missiles, airstrikes and special forces units to keep Ala-Qaida from re-establishing bases. What Will forgets is that this was American policy towards Afghanistan before 9/11. It was abandoned precisely because it did not work, as evidence by the 9/11 attacks.

George Will’s argument is that Afghanistan is a lost cause and victory is unlikely. Once again, he forgets the many pundits that said the same thing about Iraq in 2006. But with more troops, capable leadership and new strategies, the war in Iraq was turned around. The war is now all but over. American troops are returning in victory, not in inglorious withdrawal.

Like Iraq, Afghanistan is a war we cannot afford to lose. An abandoned Afghanistan overrun by the Taliban would allow Al-Qaida to re-establish bases. And established bases means that Al-Qaida would be much close to regaining its capability to strike inside the United States. It would also make the downfall of the Pakistani government far more likely. This would potentially give Al-Qaida access to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

All is not hopeless in Afghanistan.  As Anderson Cooper points out, five million refugees have returned home since 2001. One in six Afghans now own a cell phone. Millions of kids, including girls, are now in school. Under the Taliban, girls were not allowed to go to school. In 2008, Afghanistan’s GDP grew by 7.5%, the 24th highest in the world. And despite well-publicized instances of civilian deaths, the rate of civilian casualties is low. About 2,000 civilians are killed each year in the war. Compare this to the height of the Iraq War, in which 3,500 civilians were being killed each month. Adjusted for population size, civilians were 20 times more likely to be killed in Iraq than in Afghanistan.

George Will has fallen into the same trap of “Gulf War Syndrome” that many American leaders as well as the American public have fallen into in the past twenty years. “Gulf War Syndrome” is the expectation that all American wars will or should resemble Operation Desert Storm. That is, they should be short, decisive, and have low American casualties. Anything less is a failure for these people.

But Desert Storm was an almost singularly decisive victory with few parallels in military history. Most wars are not that way. Most wars are long. Most wars involve high casualties. Most wars are messy, and don’t have clear endings. That doesn’t mean we can pack up and leave whenever we want. The cost is too high.

The cost of leaving Afghanistan early is high for the United States. But the cost for Afghanistan is much higher. For the United States to renege on its commitments to the country, to abandon it to the forces which at one time drove it into the ground, to abandon our allies that we at one time swore to protect, will do more damage to America in the long run than the Taliban could ever do. Because abandoning Afghanistan to the Taliban is not just a matter of the United States cutting its losses.

It is a betrayal.

This past month, Army Private First Class Morris Walker, of the 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, 4th Airborne Brigade, 25th Infantry Division was killed in action. He is the first UNC alum to be killed in the war in Afghanistan. He was 23.

Walker graduated from UNC in 2008. He enlisted in the Army. In April 2009, he deployed to Afghanistan.

On August 18th, Pfc. Walker was riding in a Humvee on a patrol in Paktika Province when an improvised explosive device was blown up next to the vehicle, killing him along with Staff Sergeant Clayton Bowen.

UNC has a proud if subtle tradition of honoring our veterans. We have a prominent memorial to UNC war veterans between Memorial Hall and Phillips Hall. We have another prominent memorial to Civil War veterans, the famous “silent Sam” statue.

So the next time you walk past Phillips and Memorial Hall, stop, read the inscriptions, and take a moment to remember this:

For our tomorrow, they gave their today.